

## Kapitel 25

# **EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TRENDS**

## **Development Challenges of the “New Europe”**

by Richard Estes  
(University of Pennsylvania)

### **Part 1: Text**

Reprinted from:

Vogel, Joachim (Editor), Välfärd and Ofärd på 90-Talet (Good times and Hard Times in Sweden During the 1990s), Report 100: Living Conditions Series (Stockholm: Statistics Sweden), pp. 435-468.

## Foreword

European nations are undergoing rapid and fundamental social changes in response to political and economic events occurring both within and outside the region: the emergence of economic trading blocs in North America and Asia; region-wide difficulties in competing in the new global market place; unfavorable economic growth trends in combination with high rates of unemployment and underemployment; and, the collapse in December 1991 of the former Soviet Union and, with it, the sudden emergence of a large number of "new"--many poor and politically unstable—"European" countries. Added to the region's development challenges are low fertility combined with rapid population aging and accelerated migration into the region from "developing Europe" and North Africa. The response of the region's leaders to the demands confronting them have been dramatic: the creation of an economic union of the region's most robust economies (the "EU"); the adoption of the "Euro" as a single financial currency for the EU; the ratification of an evolving European Constitution; trade liberalization; and, in response to the especially profound economic challenges confronting several of the region's largest economies, a "temporary softening" of the fiscal stability rules agreed to by all members of the EU as a condition of their accession to membership. Attention also is being given to the creation of a "basket" of other measures that seek to both stimulate the regional economy and limit the rate of growth in public expenditures: deregulation of public and private industries; reductions in the size and authority of state bureaucracies; reductions in personal and corporate tax rates; increasing privatization of selected public services; reducing growth in central government expenditures for social programs; wage controls; and, more rapid devolution of selected welfare responsibilities from central governments to local communities and to families. Pressures also exist to lower further already low retirement ages in an effort to stimulate employment and reduce the less visible problem of under-employment.

Certainly, the near term social development challenges confronting Europe's social leaders are daunting: achieving a "European identity" among such a disparate group of autonomous nation states; accepting the EU's new members from Central and Eastern Europe as full and equal partners; resolving centuries-old diversity-related social conflict; agreeing on at least a functional "European Constitution"; containing

civil unrest and threats of terrorism from both within and outside the region; and, revisiting, with the goal of re-strengthening, the region's historical transatlantic partnership with the United States. As part of its approach to economic reforms, the European region also needs to give consideration to: restructuring its existing systems of post-secondary education; promoting technological innovation and entrepreneurship; taking action steps in support of its extensive environmental protection agreements; and resolving the region-wide dilemmas of large-scale population mobility from high- to low-fertility countries. The realization of these goals will require the region's leaders to adopt a more proactive approach to achieving a fully integrated "New Europe."

## 1 INTRODUCTION

European nations are undergoing rapid and fundamental social changes in response to political and economic events occurring both within and outside the region. These changes are rooted in: 1) the emergence of economic trading blocs in North America and Asia (Editors, 2002o; Mason & Turay, 1994; Rosenberg, 1992); 2) region-wide difficulties in competing in the new global market place (Editors, 2000d; Schulz, 2000; UN/ECE, 2001); 3) unfavorable economic growth trends in combination with high rates of unemployment and underemployment (Editors, 2003b; OECD, 2002; World Bank, 2003); and, 4) the collapse, in December 1991, of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and, with it, the sudden emergence of a large number of "new"--many poor and politically unstable—"European" countries (Editors, 2002d; UN/ECE, 2001). Added to the region's development challenges are low fertility combined with rapid population aging (Carlson, 2003; Editors, 2003h; Hewitt, 2002; Stranovik, Stropnik & Prinz, 2000, Vogel, 2002a) and accelerated migration into the region from "developing Europe" and North Africa (Baganha, 2002; Feld, 2000; Keely, 2001; Richmond, 2002; Stalker, 2002; Warnes, 2002).

The response of the region's leaders to the demands confronting them have been dramatic: 1) the creation of an economic union (the EU) of 15 of the region's most robust economies (Gilligham, 2003; Pond, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2002; Wessels, Maurer & Mittag, 2003)<sup>1</sup>; 2) a

---

<sup>1</sup> The European Union (EU) currently consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. An additional 10 countries will join the EU in late 2004: Cyprus, Czech

plan to enlarge the EU to 25 member-states by the end of 2004 to include the most economically advanced of the newly independent states of Eastern and Central Europe (Curzon, Landau & Whitman, 1999; Editors, 2001c; Souza & Aarle, 2003; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2003); 3) the adoption of the "Euro" as a single financial currency for the both current and new members of the EU<sup>2</sup> (Delsen, 2001; Editors, 2001b; Verdun, 2002); 4) the ratification of an evolving European Constitution (Editors, 2003f, 2003i, 2003l); 5) trade liberalization (Editors, 2002j, 2002l; UN/ECE, 2001); and, 6) in response to the especially profound economic challenges confronting several of the region's largest economies (primarily Germany and France), a possible "temporary softening" of the fiscal stability rules agreed to by all members of the EU as a condition of their accession to membership (Editors 2003p; UN/ECE, 2001).

Attention also is being given within Europe to the creation of a "basket" of other measures that seek to both stimulate the regional economy and limit the rate of growth in public expenditures: 7) deregulation of public and private industries (Brenton & Manzocchi, 2002; Editors, 2002a, 2002b, 2002e); 8) reductions in the size and authority of state bureaucracies (Alber, 2002; Busse, Wurzburg & Zappacosta, 2003; Ferge, 2001; Pierson, 2001); 9) reductions in personal and corporate tax rates (Editors, 2003m; UN/ECE, 2001); 10) increasing privatization of selected public services (Editors, 2002m, 2003c; Hyde & Dixon, 2002); 11) reducing, or at least freezing, growth in central government expenditures (CGE) for social entitlement programs; 12) the imposition of "user" and other consumption fees on selected services (Editors, 2003l, 2003n); 13) wage controls--even at the risk of higher unemployment; and, 14) more rapid devolution of selected welfare responsibilities from central governments to local communities and to families. Pressures also exist to lower further already low retirement ages in an effort to stimulate employment and reduce the less visible problem of under-employment (Brugiavini, 2001; Muller, 1999; Muller et al., 1999).

Unlike responses to earlier economic crises, many European countries are reducing, certainly

---

Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Three additional countries are under review for EU membership: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

<sup>2</sup> As of September 2003 neither Denmark, Sweden nor the United Kingdom were members of the "Euro" monetary system.

reassessing, their century-old commitment to the egalitarian principles used to inform much of the region's social policy agenda since the 1930s (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Vogel, 2002b). Increasingly, the "new social Europe" is placing comparatively greater emphasis on policies that promote "equality of opportunity" rather than, as in the past, on "equality of outcome" (Alber, 2002; Carlson, 2002; Fajth, 1999; Pierson, 2001). At the same time, a growing acquiescence appears to exist in the region of the need for significant labor reforms and, possibly, of the inevitability of higher levels of social and income inequality (Editors, 2000b, 2000c, 2002a, 2002c, 2002e, 2003e; Visser, 2000). If enacted, these latter reforms, almost certainly, will contribute adversely to the already serious problem of "social exclusion" that exists for many of the region's new economic migrants and asylum seekers (Brenton & Manzocchi, 2002; Gijsberts, 2002; Kurczewska, 1999; Morin & Vicens, 2001; Saint-Martin, 2000).

Emulating the model developed in the United States over a period of 200 years (McCarthy, 2003; Van Til, 2001)<sup>3</sup>, many European countries now are encouraging the development of "civil society" and other types of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as an alternative "third way" for supplementing, perhaps in time replacing, functions previously assumed by governments or the market, or both (Albo & Zuege, 1999; Antonucci, 2000; Ascoli, 2002; Ehrke, 2000; Marsh et al., 2002; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2003). As a result of this "shifting welfare mix," nearly everywhere in the region families and private enterprises are beginning to absorb increasingly responsibility for welfare financing and service provision--especially in the areas of health, education, elder and child care, arts and culture, and transportation (Carlson, 2002; Hyde & Dixon, 2002).

### Clear Dilemmas, Uncertain Solutions

Though still at an early stage of implementation in many countries, the region's reforms have produced mixed results and high levels of social tension (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002; Banton, 1999; Dodds, 2000; Farrell, Fella & Newman, 2002; MacMaster, 2001; McLaren, 2003; Rumford, 2000). In some countries, "far-right" political parties and movements have formed in response to the region's challenging economic situation and rapidly changing racial-ethnic mix (Editors,

---

<sup>3</sup> Other partners in the "welfare mix" include the State, the Market, and Families/Households (Evers & Wintersberger, 1988; Vogel, 2002c).000

2002k, 2002n, 2002p). On occasion, mass protests, demonstrations, strikes and even riots have occurred in response to these changes (Editors, 2003j, 2003o). These new economic and diversity-related social conflicts are unfolding even as selected countries in the region continue to struggle with problems of internal civil unrest and international terrorism (Editors 2002h, 2002i, 2003d, 2003g).

Recent disagreements between the United States and selected countries within Europe over Middle Eastern policies and the recently concluded war in Iraq have added to political tensions between the two regions and, in turn, and have contributed to a measurable weakening of the military, economic and political alliances that have characterized Euro-American relations since the end of the WWII (Editors, 2003q; Larrabee, 2002).

Even as the region's leaders struggle to find "workable solutions" to their mix of development challenges, Europe's current reform efforts almost certainly will change its "social architecture." Almost certainly, too, what it means to be "European" within an expanding geopolitical space will be subject to redefinition (Byatt, 2002; Calleo, 2003; Jasson, 2001; Maccarini, 1999; Pond, 2002; Soysal, 2002; Tallberg, 2003). These challenges are likely to intensify as EU member states eventually are forced to make decisions concerning the admissibility of Turkey and Russia into the EU and into the "New Europe" (Editors, 2000a, 2002f, 2002g).

On a more positive note, the dramatic social changes occurring in Europe have stimulated important refinements to a new set of emerging social constructs in development theory: "social cohesion" (Saint-Martin, 2000), "social exclusion" (Borzaga et al., 2001; De Haan, 1998; Van Winden, 2001), "social reporting" (Noll, 2002; Vogel 2002b), "social space" (Maccarini, 1999), "social capital" (Bertolini & Bravo, 2002; Muntaner, Lynch & Smith, 2001; Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis & Geliissen, 2002), and "transnational citizenship" (Balibar, 2004), among others. In time, the refinements that emerge from these conceptual efforts will likely add a new set of concepts to development theory and practice for both Europe and elsewhere.

### Assessing European Social Progress

This paper assesses the extent to which European nations are succeeding in advancing their far-reaching social development agenda. More specifically, the paper:

1 reports the results obtained through application of a statistically weighted version of the

author's previously developed *Index of Social Progress* (ISP; WISP) to an analysis of European development trends since 1970;

- 2 identifies Europe's major 30-year social development successes and failures in responding to at least the basic needs of its residents;
- 3 identifies Europe's "social development leaders" (SLs), "middle performing countries" (MPCs), and "socially less developed countries" (SLDCs);
- 4 reports a special analysis of 30-year social development trends for the five states of the Nordic subregion (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden);
- 5 compares the major social development trends occurring in Europe with those observed for other major world regions;
- 6 identifies and briefly discusses the major social, political, and economic forces that are likely to influence Europe's further development toward the year 2010 and beyond; and,
- 7 provides baseline data against which future developments in Europe region may be assessed.

## 2 METHODOLOGY

The present study is the fourth in a series of analyses of worldwide social development trends (Estes, 1984, 1988, 1998b, 2004). The purpose of all four studies has been: 1) to identify significant changes in "adequacy of social provision"<sup>4</sup> occurring throughout the world; and 2) to assess national and international progress in providing more adequately for the basic social and material needs of the world's growing population.

### Index of Social Progress (ISP)

The primary instrument used in this study is the author's extensively pre-tested "Index of Social Progress" (ISP). In its present form the ISP consists of 40 social indicators<sup>5</sup> that have been

<sup>4</sup> "Adequacy of social provision" refers to the changing capacity of societies to provide for the basic social, material, and other needs of the people living within their borders, e.g., for food, clothing, shelter, and access to at least basic health, education, and social services, etc. (Estes, 1984).

<sup>5</sup> For methodological reasons, the ISP's 40 indicators are divided between positive and negative indicators of social progress. On the Education Subindex, for example, higher adult illiteracy rates are negatively associated with social progress whereas gains in primary school enrollment levels are positively associated with overall improvements in development.

subdivided into 10 subindexes (Table 1): *Education* (N=3); *Health Status* (N=7); *Women Status* (N=5); *Defense Effort* (N=1); *Economic* (N=5); *Demographic* (N=3); *Environmental* (N=3); *Social Chaos* (N=5); *Cultural Diversity* (N=3); and *Welfare Effort* (N=5). All 40 of the WISP's indicators are judged to be valid and reliable indicators of social development; indeed, the majority of the ISP's indicators are used regularly in other studies comparative social development (Noll, 2002; Vogel, 2002b).

### **Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP)**

Owing to the volume of data gathered for this analysis only statistically-weighted index and subindex scores will be reported. The study's statistical weights were derived through a two-stage varimax factor analysis in which each indicator and subindex was analyzed for its relative contribution toward explaining the variance associated with changes in social progress over time. Standardized subindex scores were then multiplied by the factor loadings to create weighted subindex scores. Composite Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP) scores were obtained through a summation of the weighted subindex scores.<sup>6</sup> The formulae used in the computation of WISP index and subindex scores are summarized in Table 2.

### **The WISP Versus Other Measures of Social Progress**

The Index of Social Progress differs from other measures of social development in the number, range, and relevance of the indicators used in its construction. In all cases, the ISP is judged to be a more comprehensive, valid, and reliable instrument for assessing changes in social development *over time* than other indices used to measure international social progress (e.g., Gross National Product [GNP], Gross Domestic Product [GDP], the UNDP's "Human Development Index" [HDI], among others).

### **Data Sources**

The majority of the data used in the analysis were obtained from annual reports supplied by individual countries to the United Nations, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Office of Policy Studies of the U.S. Social Security Administration, and other international data

collection organizations. Data for the *Social Chaos* and *Environmental* subindexes were obtained from independent scholars and private, non-governmental, organizations including Amnesty International (AI), Freedom House, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IRCRC), the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), and Transparency International (TI). Data for the *Cultural Diversity* subindex were obtained from both the *World Factbook* and independent scholars working in the fields of comparative language, religion and ethnology.

### **Country Selection**

Thirty-six European countries were selected for inclusion in the analysis (Table 3). The primary criterion used in the selection of these countries included the availability of timely, reliable and comprehensive social indicator data. Countries with missing, inadequate, incomplete, or seriously distorted data on three or more indicators, and for which reasonable estimates of the missing data could not be determined, were excluded from the analysis.

### **Time Frame**

Index and subindex findings are reported separately for each of four time periods, i.e., 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000; thus, the study provides a cross-sectional analysis of the "state" of European social development over a 30-year period.<sup>7</sup> Current indicator data for selected variables contained on the WISP are reported in Tables 3-6. For comparative purposes beyond the European region, these tables also include indicator data for the United States.

### **Levels of Analysis**

Data are reported for three levels of analysis: 1) development trends occurring in Europe vis-a-vis those of other world regions; 2) subregional variations; and, 3) development trends occurring in each of the 36 countries included in this analysis.

<sup>6</sup> For a fuller explanation of these procedures and the system of statistical weights that resulted from application of these procedures see Estes, 1988:199-209.

<sup>7</sup> Data for the majority of successor states to the former Soviet Union (FSU) are reported for 1995 & 2000 only.

### 3 EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLDWIDE DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Charts 1 and 2 summarize the study's major findings on the WISP for all 163 countries included in the larger analysis of social development trends worldwide (Estes, 1998b; 2004). These time-series data cover the period 1970-2000 and reflect comparative WISP performance for countries grouped by six continental groupings, i.e., North America (N=2), Australia-New Zealand (N=2), Europe (N=36), Latin America (N=26), Asia (N=45), and Africa (N=50).

1. The world's most socially developed regions are North America, Australia-New Zealand, and Europe. These regions had already attained the most favorable WISP ratings by 1970; further improvements on the index continued to accumulate between 1970-1980 and, again, between 1980-1990 (Chart 1). Today, comparatively few differences characterize the development profiles of the socially advanced countries of North America (2000 WISP Average= 85), Australia-New Zealand (2000 WISP Average= 91), and Europe (2000 WISP Average= 87).
2. The world's socially least developed regions are Africa (2000 WISP Average= 18) and Asia (2000 WISP Average= 46). WISP scores for the African region consistently were lower relative to those attained by other world regions for the entire 30-year period studied.
3. As reported in Chart 2, substantial gains occurred on the WISP for five world regions between 1970 and 2000: Asia (+30%); North America (+15%); Australia-New Zealand (+12%); Europe (+11%); and, Latin America (+10%). Unfortunately, four out of five of these regions experienced net social losses on the WISP during 10-year period 1990-2000: North America (-7%), Latin America (-4%), Europe (-3%), and Australia-New Zealand (-1%).

In the main, the recent net social losses reported for the North American, Australia-New Zealand and European regions are associated with decade-long economic problems, the emergence of conservative national governments in many countries, a general trend toward the devolution of political authority and fiscal responsibility

from central to local governments and to the private sector (Ascoli, 2002; Karlson, 2002). Environmental issues and higher levels of diversity-related social conflict also contributed to the lower average WISP scores for these regions in 2000.

4. The 50 nations of the African region also experienced social losses on the WISP for the 10-year period 1990-2000 (an average region wide loss of -10%). Africa's 10-year social losses were most pronounced in the Middle Africa (-33%) and East Africa (-31%) subregions and were less dramatic in the continent's oil-rich Northern (-5%) subregion (Estes, 2004). Net 10-year social gains on the WISP, however, were observed for Africa's human capital and natural resource rich Southern (3%) region. Some recent, but only modest, gains in social progress also were measured for Africa's currently war-ravaged Western subregion (+2%).<sup>8</sup>

Africa's continuing unfavorable economic situation, recurrent wars, high levels of diversity-related social conflict, and public corruption account for most of the region's decades-long social losses. Africa's current social development situation is all the more tragic given the region's "least development countries" (LDCs) have been the preferential recipients of international development assistance since at least 1980 (including debt rescheduling and forgiveness, reduced tariffs on exports, and rising levels of foreign private sector investments). HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, however, have combined with the region's geographic isolation, failed political systems, inadequate social infrastructures to exacerbate the already impossible situation that exists for Sub Saharan Africa's deeply impoverished nations.

5. Asia experienced an additional +6% gains in the region's average WISP scores between 1990 and 2000. Asia continues to be the most rapidly developing region in the world with a net gain on the WISP of +30% between 1970 and 2000--an especially impressive accomplishment given that the region includes the world's two population "super giants", i.e., China (Population=1.2 billion) and India (Population=1.1 billion). Both the nature and pace of social development occurring in China and India differ markedly

<sup>8</sup> Among other countries, West Africa includes Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone.

from one another with the most dramatic improvements in social development since 1990 occurring in China which attained a 2000 WISP score of 56 vs. only 34 for India (Estes, 2004).

Asia's steady social progress is associated with consistently higher rates of economic expansion, an overall slowing in average population growth rates, the end of decades-old civil and intra-regional wars, significant advances in the health and education status of the region's women and children, and increased attention on the part of many of the region's governments to the social needs of their elderly and other historically disadvantaged population groups.

The recipient of a vast amounts of international development assistance since 1985, recent gains in Asian social development are the direct result of these past social investments (Estes, 1992, 1996b). These gains are reflected across a broad range of socioeconomic sectors, albeit the political infrastructure of many of the region's countries continues to lag far behind that of other rapidly developing world regions and subregions (e.g., China, North Korea, Myanmar).

Considerable 30-year variation exists on the WISP, then, for the world's major continental groupings. Between 1970 and 1990 the world's most economically advanced regions continued to add to their overall levels of social development, albeit some of these gains were lost during the 10-year period that ended in 2000. Already the world's socially least developed region, Africa, as a region, continued to lose social ground over the entire 30-year period of the study. The average net social gains reported for Asia and Latin America are especially important given the high levels of financial poverty and social chaos that have characterized these regions in the recent past.

## 4 EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Thirty-year social development trends for Europe are summarized in Charts 3 and 4. WISP scores are reported in these charts both for the region-as-whole (N=36) and for each of the region's four subregions: Western Europe (N=7), Southern Europe (N=9), Eastern Europe (N=10), and Northern Europe (N=10). Regional performances on the WISP's ten *subindexes* are reported separately in Charts 5 and 6. Country-specific WISP scores for 2000 are reported in

Chart 7 which rank orders countries by overall development level. Selected social indicator data for all 36 countries included in the analysis are reported in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 which also rank orders and groups countries by their overall social development performance as either a regional "social leader" (SL), "middle performing country" (MPC), or "socially least developing country" (SLDC).

### Regional Performance on the WISP

Europe's regional scores on the WISP averaged 79, 80, 90 and 87 for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, respectively (Chart 3). In comparison with other world regions, Europe ranked second in 2000 on the WISP in overall level of social development, i.e., a net improvement of one rank between 1990 and 2000 (average WISP scores for the North American region dropped from 1<sup>st</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup> during the same time period). Even so, comparatively few differences characterize the 2000 development levels of the world's three leading continental groupings of nations.

The *pace* of social change occurring in Europe, however, is more modest than that observed for other socially advanced regions, i.e., a 30-year net increase of +11% for the European region compared with net gains in the WISP of approximately +30% and +15% for the Asian and North American regions, respectively (Chart 2).

Europe's comparatively slower pace of social development is explained by a number of factors:

- 1) the region's already highly advanced social development status;
- 2) the region's recent difficulties in accelerating economic growth beyond a low-moderate level;
- 3) continuing high levels of unemployment, but especially high levels of long-term and youth unemployment;
- 4) recent downward revisions in the region's high levels of social protection;
- 5) the collapse of the FSU and its highly negative short- and near-term impact throughout Europe;
- 6) the enormous social, cultural, economic and political heterogeneity that characterizes the "New Europe";
- 7) rising levels of diversity-related social conflict; and
- 8) the more favorable patterns of technological and economic change taking place in the Asia and North America.

The eventual development of a European “identity” and the emergence of at least a tentative European Constitution could contribute significantly toward removing many of the impediments that currently are slowing the region’s pace of social development.

### **Subregional Performance on the WISP**

Considerable variation exists in the development trends of Europe’s four subregions. Chart 3 confirms that Europe’s most developed subregions are its Western (N=7) and Northern subregions (N=10) with 2000 WISP scores averaging 97 and 94, respectively. Conversely, Europe’s Southern (N=9) and Eastern (N=10) subregions are the least socially developed with 2000 WISP scores averaging 81 and 80, respectively.

Significant differences also exist with respect to the *pace* of social change occurring in each of the subregions. The region’s most significant 30-year improvements occurred in the Southern (+21%) and Western (+18%) subregions followed by 30-year net improvements of +7% in Northern Europe; by comparison, development trends in East Europe advanced an average of only +3% between 1970 and 2000 (Chart 4). Hence, social development continued to advance most rapidly in those subregions that already were the most developed *at the outset of the study*; the slowest and most negative social changes occurred in Europe’s already most disadvantaged subregion.

In general, European patterns of subregional development mirror those observed for other world subregions, i.e., comparatively higher, and more rapid, rates of development within Europe’s already socially advanced subregions and correspondingly slower rates of development in its already most socially disadvantaged subregions (Estes, 1990, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1998a).

### **European Regional Performance on the WISP Subindexes**

European performances on the WISP subindexes are summarized in Charts 5 and 6. The region’s performances on the 10 subindexes were consistently strong and exceeded average subindex performances for nearly all other world regions and, certainly, for those of the world-as-a-whole (Charts 1 and 2). The social trends reflected in these data also are consistent with those previously reported by the author for earlier decades of European social development (Estes, 1986, 1997).

The region’s social performances in 2000 were particularly strong on eight of the WISP’s ten subindexes (Chart 5): *Population* (2000 Average= 24), *Welfare Effort* (2000 Average= 21), *Health Status* (2000 Average= 19), *Education* (2000 Average= 19), *Women Status* (2000 Average= 17), *Economic* (2000 Average= 16), *Social Chaos* (2000 Average= 16), and *Cultural Diversity* (2000 Average= 14). By contrast, and somewhat surprisingly, the European region performed less favorably on the *Defense Effort* (2000 Average= 13) and *Environmental* (2000 Average= 11) subindexes. The region’s less impressive performances on these subindexes suggests the need for even greater attention within Europe to reducing further defense and military expenditures and for increasing investments in environmental protection. Fortunately, steady improvements on the *Defense Effort* subindex between 1970 and 2000 added to the region’s overall improvement in this sector of +23% over the 30-year period. Region wide changes in the *Environmental* sector, however, reflect net 30-year losses of -27% (all of which occurred during the 10-year period 1990-2000).

These subindex findings suggests the more or less *synchronous* nature of social development in Europe; however, important variations exist both within and between the Defense and Environmental sectors vs. Europe’s exceptional performance in the more traditional “social” sectors (Estes, 2004).

## **5 EUROPEAN “SOCIAL LEADERS” (SLs), AND “SOCIALY LEAST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES” (SLDCs)**

Despite Europe’s highly favorable WISP performances *as-a-region*, significant variations exist in the WISP performances of individual countries. These differences are reflected in the composite scores and ranks reported in Chart 7 and Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6. Table 3, for example, identifies Europe’s “Social Leaders” (SLs), “Middle Performing Countries” (MPCs), and “Socially Least Developing Countries” (SLDCs) *relative to all 163 countries included in the larger study of social development trends worldwide* (Estes, 2004).

### **Europe’s Social Development “Leaders” (SLs)**

Ranked by overall level of social performance on the WISP (Table 3), Europe’s social devel-

opment leaders (SLs) are: Sweden (WISP=107; Rank=1); Denmark (WISP=107; Rank=1); Norway (WISP=104; Rank=3); Finland (WISP=101; Rank=4); Luxembourg (WISP=100; Rank=5); Germany (WISP=100; Rank=5); Austria (WISP=100; Rank=5); Iceland (WISP=98; Rank=8); Italy (WISP=98; Rank=8); Belgium (WISP=97; Rank=10); United Kingdom (WISP=96; Rank=11); Spain (WISP=96; Rank=11); Netherlands (WISP=95; Rank=13); France (WISP=94; Rank=14); Ireland (WISP=94; Rank=14); Switzerland (WISP=93; Rank=16); Hungary (WISP=91; Rank=18); Portugal (WISP=90; Rank=20); Greece (WISP=90; Rank=20); Bulgaria (WISP=89; Rank=22); Czech Republic (WISP=88; Rank=24); Slovakia (WISP=87; Rank=25); Slovenia (WISP=85; Rank=27); and Poland (WISP=85; Rank=27).

Nearly all of the top 20 countries listed above have been ranked as SLs since the initiation of WISP surveys in 1970. The majority of these SLs already are members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)<sup>9</sup> and as of September 2003, twenty (N=21) are either current members, or soon-to-be-members, of the European Union; an additional SL, Bulgaria, is under consideration for accession to the EU as well.<sup>10</sup> In all, 64% of the Europe's total population of 722 million persons, i.e., 463 million, reside in its SLs (Table 3).

WISP scores for the region's SLs averaged 95 in 2000—an average score well above that attained by any other grouping of socially advanced countries worldwide (Chart 1). Further, Europe's SLs are characterized by the region's highest average per capita GDP (\$22,675), lowest average rate of inflation (4.1%), and lowest average rate of unemployment (8.1%), albeit European SL performances on all three indicators are appreciably less favorable than those attained by SLs located in North America and Australia-New Zealand (Table 4; Editors 2003b). European SLs also currently are experi-

encing sluggish rates of economic expansion (+1.8%) relative to both to the region's MPCs (+5.9%) and SLDCs (+3.5%) and to SLs located elsewhere in the world (Estes, 2004).

Of importance, too, is the rapid population aging occurring in Europe's SLs, i.e., 19% aged 65 years or older vs. 16% and 11% for the region's MPCs and SLDCs, respectively (Table 3). One outcome of rapid population aging for the region's SLs, but consistent with the region's general approach to social policy, has been the creation of an extensive network of social programs that reduce the economic risks associated with retirement, disability, solitary survivorship, and other age-related threats to income security (USDHHS, 2002). Though highly effective, these social programs also are quite expensive consume a large share of both total CGE and GDP (Table 6).

### Europe's Socially Least Developing Countries (SLDCs)

The region's four socially least developing countries (SLDCs) are: Macedonia (WISP=63; Rank=53); Albania (WISP=65; Rank=49); Moldova (WISP=67; Rank=47), and the Russian Federation (WISP=67; Rank=47).

All four the region's SLDCs are located in either Southern (Albania and Macedonia) or Eastern Europe (Moldova and the Russian Federation) and each nation was under the direct influence of the FSU. Following the collapse of the FSU in 1991 each SLDC, in turn, has been subject to exceptional levels of social, political and economic turmoil (Howard, 2003; Kopecka & Mudde, 2003; Rose & Munro, 2003). Tragically, all four countries continue to experience varying levels of political instability, diversity-related social conflict and, at best, only moderate prospects over the near-term for significant improvements in their economies (Table 4; UN/ECE, 2001). Even so, the region's SLDCs are rich in human and natural resources and share an ideological orientation that can serve as a launching pad for promoting more rapid social progress over the near-term. The Russian Federation, for example, already is a member of the "G8+1"<sup>11</sup> group of nations and is seeking "can-

<sup>9</sup> Established in 1960, the mission of the OECD is to "promote economic cooperation and development (among member states)." The current members of the OECD (N=30) are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The EU also has an "special" membership with the OECD.

<sup>10</sup> Iceland and Spain are neither members nor candidate members of the EU.

<sup>11</sup> Established in October 1975, the purpose of the G-8 is to "to facilitate economic cooperation among the developed countries that participated in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation held in several sessions between December 1975 and June 1977. Current members of the G-8 include: Canada, the EU (as one member), France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

didacy status” for membership in the EU. As of this writing, however, neither Albania, Macedonia, nor Moldova were under consideration for inclusion in the EU.

Average WISP scores for the SLDCs since 1991 are the lowest in Europe and, overall, reflect a pattern of comparative slow social development, i.e., an average score of 62 and 66 for 1995 and 2000, respectively. Further, SLDC average per capita income levels (\$4,770), unemployment (19%) and inflation rates (22%) are the least favorable in the European region (Table 4). Wealth distribution also tends to be the less equitable within the SLDCs with 50% of total household earnings being “captured” by the top 20% of income earners vs. only 5% by the bottom 20% of income earners (Gini Coefficient=44.7).

The region’s SLDCs contain approximately 155 million persons, about 21% of Europe’s total population (Table 3). Unlike elsewhere in Europe, fertility in the SLDCs is comparatively high with an under-age-15-years population of 17%; SLDC aged comprise only 11% of the population vs. a region wide average of 17% (Table 3). Public expenditures in the SLDCs for targeted social programs to assist the poor, the unemployed, elderly persons, the sick and disabled, children and families, and others at high risk of poverty and social exclusion are the lowest among European nations (Table 6). The highly disadvantaged position of the region’s SLDCs pose special challenges for the EU other regional bodies that are seeking the hasten the process of European harmonization and integration, including that of the region’s SLDCs.

### Europe's Middle-Range Performing Countries

An additional eight countries were identified on the WISP as European Middle Performing Countries (MPCs): Estonia (WISP=81; Rank=31); Belarus; (WISP=78; Rank=33); Romania (WISP=77; Rank=34); Latvia (WISP=77; Rank=34); Yugoslavia (WISP=76; Rank=37); Lithuania (WISP=74; Rank=39); the Ukraine (WISP=71; Rank=41); and, Croatia (WISP=70; Rank=43).

Like the region’s SLDCs, all eight countries either were part of the FSU or under its direct influence. Today, all eight countries are fully autonomous nation-states characterized by varying degrees of open market economic and participatory political systems. Most also are characterized by emerging civil society organiza-

tions that supplement, replace or compete with services and other activities provided by their respective public sectors (Meier-Dallach & Juchler, 2002; Sokolowski, 2001).

Approximately 105 million people live in the region’s MPCs, about 15% of Europe’s total population (Table 3). Nearly all of the population of the region’s MPCs live the urban areas and, as a result, the economies of these countries are in the process of being transformed from agriculture to manufacturing and services (World Bank, 2002:56-58, 2003). Population aging is increasing rapidly within these countries as well (16% are 65 years of age or older) but fertility in the MPCs, as elsewhere in Europe, is on decline; youth under the age of 15 years currently account for less than 15% of the MPC population mix (Table 3).

Income distribution is more equitable in the MPCs than in the region’s SLDCs, but still quite concentrated with a subregional Gini Coefficient averaging 30.5. Per capita income levels in the MPCs averaged only \$7,156 in 2000, albeit but the pace of MPC economic expansion is the most rapid in Europe (6%); but so, too, is inflation which averaged 38% through much of 2003 (Table 4).

Though substantially lower than that of the SLDC’s (19%), unemployment in the MPCs is high (11%). The absence of adequate employment for large segments of their economically active population is driving many of the unemployed to seek economic opportunities elsewhere in Europe, the Middle East and North America. The loss of substantial numbers of highly educated and skilled young people within a comparatively short period of time represents a major assault on the human resource base of the MPCs—human and other skill resources they very much need for rebuilding their own new economies and political systems.

With respect to overall patterns of social development, European MPCs very much are in “the middle” and confirm the highly uneven nature of the development trends that are occurring within these countries. WISP scores for the MPCs, for example, averaged 74 and 75 in 1995 and 2000, respectively with the most favorable 5-year increases observed for Belarus (+15%); composite scores for the Ukraine and Lithuania during the same period declined by -9% and -2% respectively.

Despite the difficult economic challenges confronting them, and much like the region’s SLs, European MPCs have a long history of organized, well integrated, systems of social provision (USDHHS, 2002). In recent years

what were previously entirely publicly-financed and provided programs have been supplemented by alternative programs and services provided by the subregion's rapidly expanding network of for-profit and not-for-profit civil society organizations. As a result, social expenditures for health, education, housing and income support programs remain high in the MPCs and, as for European SLs, account for a large share of total CGE and GDP (Table 6; World Bank, 2002:82-84).

## 6 Subregional Performance of the Nordic States on the WISP

The region's five Nordic states both exemplify the general development trends occurring in Europe and, at the same time, offer additional insights into the dynamics of social development across a broad range of social, political and economic sectors (Editors, 2003a).

Europe's Northern subregion includes the five "Nordic" states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Since at least the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century the Nordic states have been world leaders in social development and, indeed, their approach to "social praxis" influenced social policy development throughout much of the industrial and post-industrial world. The high level of social, political and economic development that currently exists for the 24.1 million people that reside in the Nordic countries (Table 3) is all the more remarkable given the equally high levels of income poverty, assaults on the physical environment, recurrent intra-regional tensions, and general lack of technological innovation among other impediments to development that characterized these nations at the beginning of the last century (Borish, 1991). Clearly, the creation of a Nordic "region" within Europe (i.e., "Scandinavia"), the emergence of a Nordic trade zone,<sup>12</sup> and formation of even a "Nordic identity" has served to reinforce a set of shared values and high levels of civility between and among the Nordic people and other states and peoples. These developments, in turn, have contributed to steady advances in social progress within the Scandina-

vian subregion which, for more than a decade, has taken a moral and fiscal lead in setting the standard for productive ways in which economically well-off countries can best assist the world's poorer nations in accelerating their pace of development (Table 5).

All five of the Nordic states rank among the top ten performers on the WISP for 2000; indeed, the Nordic states have been among the top ten performers on the WISP for each study period since 1970. Today, Sweden and Denmark share 1<sup>st</sup> place in the WISP rankings, Norway ranks 2<sup>nd</sup>, Finland ranks 3<sup>rd</sup> and Iceland, with a population of just 0.3 million people, ranks 8<sup>th</sup> (after Luxembourg, Germany and Austria which share 5<sup>th</sup> place in the WISP rankings—Table 3 and Chart 7). And, the *pace* of social development in the Nordic region has been more rapid than that observed for Europe-in-general (+17% for the period 1970-2000 vs. an average increase of +11% for Europe-as-a-whole—Charts 4 and 9). Nordic social development also outpaced that of the remaining five states of Northern Europe<sup>13</sup> but was comparable to that observed for Western Europe<sup>14</sup> (+18%).

### Sweden as an Exemplar of a Small, Socially Advanced, State?

Social changes in Sweden since 1970 illustrate many of the development challenges and trends confronted by the Nordic states-as-a-group. The most populous of the Nordic states (Table 3), Sweden also has the subregion's largest economy—\$226 billion in 2001 (World Bank, 2003:235)—but ranks fifth out of the five Nordic countries with respect to adjusted PPP per capita income level, i.e., \$24,277 vs. an average of \$28,030 for the other four Nordic states (Table 4). Economic growth over the near-term for Sweden is expected to average only 1.4% for 2003 and 2.2% in 2004—vs. 0.6% and 1.7% for the 15-nation Euro region and 2.3% and 3.4% for the United States for the same time periods (Editors, 2003b:72). Despite comparatively higher average economic growth rates, inflation in Sweden also is high with consumer prices projected to increase at an average annual rate of 2.2% in 2003 and 1.6% in 2004 vs. 1.3% for both the Euro region and the United States in 2004 (Editors, 2003b:72).

<sup>12</sup> The Nordic Council (NC) was established in 1952 to "promote regional economic, cultural, and environmental cooperation (among the Nordic states). Membership in the NC (N=5) consists of Denmark (including Faroe Islands and Greenland), Finland (including Aland Islands), Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. In addition the NC has three "observer" members: the Sami (Lapp) local parliaments of Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

<sup>13</sup> Estonia (1995-2000= +1.1), Ireland (1970-2000= +11.6), Latvia (1995-2000= +4.1), Lithuania (1995-2000= -2.3), and the United Kingdom (1970-2000= +10.1).

<sup>14</sup> Western Europe (N=7) consists of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland.

Sweden also struggles with high levels of unemployment, including appreciably higher levels of youth and long-term unemployment (OECD, 2002:21).<sup>15</sup> Underemployment—too few hours of paid employment or employment in jobs appreciably below qualification or skill level—also is a major problem confronting Swedish social leaders. These four intertwined problems of the labor force—high overall unemployment, high youth unemployment, now chronic long-term unemployment, and serious underemployment—undermine not only the Swedish work ethic but also the principles on which its system of economic redistribution was founded (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Vogel, 2002c). Combined with rapid population aging, low fertility and high immigration into Sweden from outside the Nordic region, Sweden now faces the problem of how best—from an equity perspective—to respond to the needs of many who are making demands on the country's comprehensive entitlement system vs. the diminishing proportion of Swedish tax payers who are financing the country's "tax and spend" entitlement schemes (Carlson, 2002; Editors, 2003a).<sup>16</sup>

According to Sweden's former prime minister Carl Bildt (2003) and others, Sweden's decision to remain outside the EU monetary system (the "Euro") may well disadvantage the country in terms of its future trade aspirations both within and outside the EU. Sweden's exemplary pattern of technological innovation and entrepreneurship (Table 5) may not be sufficient over the long-term to overcome the disadvantages of maintaining a separate monetary system. In any case, the complex of economic problems confronting Sweden are contributing to the higher

levels of diversity-related social conflict occurring both in Sweden and elsewhere in the Nordic subregion—much of its associated with the arrival of "large numbers" of new immigrant communities and asylum seekers seeking permanent resettlement in the Nordic states.

### Sweden's Development Performance on the WISP

Charts 10 and 11 summarize major Swedish social development trends on the WISP for the 30-year period 1970-2000. As reported in Chart 7, along with Denmark, Sweden currently ranks 1<sup>st</sup> in overall level of social development, a net increase in two ranks positions on the WISP since 1990.

Sweden's decades-long social development accomplishments are clearly reflected in her performances since 1970 on the *Population, Welfare Effort, Women Status, Education, Social Chaos, Health* and *Economic* subindexes (Chart 10). The scores reported for Sweden on these subindexes are well above the world average of 10.0<sup>17</sup> (N=163) as well as those reported for Europe in general (Chart 5, N=36) and Scandinavia in particular (Chart 8, N=5). Sweden's time-series scores on the *Cultural Diversity* subindex, which functions as a measure of the "speed" at which innovations in social development can take place, also were highly favorable.

As reflected on the WISP, the major social development challenges confronting Sweden are those captured by the *Defense Effort* and *Environmental* subindexes. Performances on these subindexes were comparatively mediocre (12.2 and 10.6 in 2000, respectively) and were little better than those reported for the world-as-a-whole (World Average=10.0). Swedish comparative "under-performance" in the defense and environmental sectors is surprising given the highly visible role that Sweden seeks to carry in promoting regional and world peace (even as it continues to be a major supplier of armaments worldwide<sup>18</sup>) as well as its efforts in providing at least regional leadership in advancing environmental protection. Fortunately, net improvements were observed for Sweden on the *Environment* subindex between 1990-2000 (+8%). However, losses accumulated on the country's

<sup>15</sup> Total unemployment for Sweden averaged 5.0% in August 2003 vs. 4.3% in August 2002 (Editors, 2003b:72). Youth unemployment currently hovers around 12% vs. 4.5% in 1990, but long-term unemployment (i.e., involuntary joblessness for a period of 12 or months) currently exceeds 26% vs. 12% in 1990 (OECD, 2002:21). Though Sweden's youth and long-term unemployment rates are substantially more favorable than those reported for the Euro region (16% / 47%), the United States (9% / 6%), and the 26 OECD member states (12% / 33%), joblessness at this level represents a major challenge to the "social inclusion through work" tenants on which much of Swedish and Nordic social policy has been based for the past 50 years.

<sup>16</sup> The highest marginal corporate tax rate in Sweden was 28% in 2000 vs. a rate of 31% on personal incomes higher than \$27,000; by comparison, the highest marginal tax rates in the United States for the same period were 35% on corporations and 40% on individuals with incomes greater than \$297,000 (World Bank, 2002:298).

<sup>17</sup> The world average for each subindex was set statistically at 10.0 (Estes, 1988:199-209).

<sup>18</sup> Swedish exports of conventional armaments exceeded \$486 million 2001 and more than \$1,123 million between 1997 and 2001 (SIPRI, 2002: Table 8.A.2).

*Defense Effort* subindex (-15%) during the same period as a result of Sweden's higher expenditures for defense *relative to* many other of the region's "social leaders," i.e., military expenditures accounted for 2.1% of Swedish GDP in 2000<sup>19</sup> vs. an average of 1.7% of GDP for all 24 European SLs (Table 6; UNDP, 2003:207-211).

The data summarized in Chart 11 provide additional insights into the nature and pace of Swedish social development. These data reflect *percentage changes* in Swedish social development performance both on the composite WISP and on each of its ten subindexes for four time periods: 1970-80; 1980-90; 1990-2000; and for the full 30-year period 1970-2000. Sweden's most impressive 30-year social development gains on the subindexes occurred in just three sectors, two of which already have been identified as sectors in which Sweden has underperformed relative to other European SLs: *Environmental* (+54%), *Defense Effort* (+24%), and *Population* (+17%). Significant 10-year improvements occurred on the *Women Status* subindex (+29%) between 1990-2000 but only modest advances were observed for the *Cultural Diversity* subindex (4%). Thirty-year social performance on an additional five subindexes also were of a more moderate nature (ranging from +2.8% on the *Health* subindex to -2.9% on the *Education* subindex—two sectors in which Sweden already excels).

## 7 CONCLUSIONS

European nations have a long and distinguished record of success in providing for the social, political, and economic needs of their populations. Indeed, the region's social achievements often have served as the yardstick by which other nations have judged their own social accomplishments. The analysis summarized in this paper offers clear evidence of the high degree of consensus that exists in Europe concerning both the goals and means of social development. Evidence also is provided of the region's ability to advance development objectives across societies whose cultures and social systems differ significantly from one another.

The dramatic social, political and economic changes occurring in Europe today are likely to challenge all of the region's long-held assumptions. Chronically slow rates of economic growth, moderate inflation levels, high unemployment, rapid population aging, low fertility,

and declining export opportunities are placing enormous strains on the fiscal and political capacity of many of the region's countries. Large scale migration into the region of persons from developing countries is changing fundamentally the European "social fabric". Further, the political map of Europe itself has been changed by the sudden emergence of some 26 "new" European nations since 1991--the majority of which are considerably poorer than other parts of Europe and have had little or no recent experience in operating free market economic or democratic political systems.

Certainly, the near term social development challenges confronting Europe's social leaders are daunting: 1) achieving a "European identity" among such a disparate group of autonomous nation states; 2) accepting the EU's new members from Central and Eastern Europe as full and equal partners; 3) resolving centuries-old diversity-related social conflict; 4) agreeing on at least a functional "European Constitution"; 5) containing civil unrest and threats of terrorism from both within and outside the region; and, 6) revisiting, with the goal of re-strengthening, the region's historical transatlantic partnership with the United States. As part of its approach to economic reforms, the European region also needs to give serious consideration to which in which increasing priority can be assigned to: 7) realigning and restructuring its existing systems of post-secondary education; 8) promoting technological innovation and entrepreneurship; 8) taking action steps in support of its extensive basket of environmental protection agreements; and 9) resolving the region-wide dilemmas of large-scale population mobility from high- to low-fertility countries. The realization of these goals will require the region's leaders to adopt a more proactive and inclusive approach to achieving a fully integrated "New Europe."

<sup>19</sup> These expenditures accounted for 5.5% of all central government expenditures in 1999 (World Bank, 2002:304-306).

## REFERENCES

- Alber, Jens: 2002, "Is modernization driving the welfare state backwards to the past?", *Berliner Journal fur Soziologies* 12(1), pp. 5-35.
- Albo, Greg & Alan Zuege: 1999, "European capitalism today: Between the Euro and the 'third way'", *Monthly Review* 51(3), pp. 100-119.
- Antonucci, Maria C.: 2000, "Leaving liberalism to find a 'third way'?", *Sociologia* 34(3), pp. 117-120.
- Ascoli, Ugo (Editors): 2002, *Dilemmas of the Welfare Mix: The New Structure of Welfare in an Era of Privatization* (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
- Ash, Timothy G.: 2001, "The European orchestra," *The New York Review* (May 17), pp.60-68.
- Baganha, Maria I. 2002, "Migration in Europe: Challenge of citizenship," *Portuguese J of Social Science* 1(2), pp. 82-88.
- Baldwin-Edwards, Martin: 2002, "Semi-reluctant hosts: Southern Europe's ambivalent response to immigration," *Studi Emigrazione/Etudes Migrations* 39(145), pp. 27-48.
- Balibar, Etienne: 2004, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Banton, Michael: 1999, "National integration and ethnic violence in Western Europe," *J of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 25(1), pp. 5-20.
- Bertolini, Sonia & Giangiacomo Bravo: 2002, "Social capital: a multidimensional concept," <http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/politics/research/socialcapital/other/bertolini.pdf>
- Bildt, Carl. 2003. The myth of Swedish superiority, *Financial Times* (of London), August 6, p. 13.
- Borish, Steven M.: 1991, *The Land of the Living: The Danish Folk High Schools and the Denmark's Non-Violent Path to Modernization* (Nevada City CA: Blue Dolphin Press).
- Brenton, Paul & Stefano Manocchi (Editors): 2002, *Enlargement, Trade, and Investment: The Impact of Barriers to Trade in Europe* (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing).
- Borzaga, Carlo, Benedetto Gui & Fabrizio Povinelli: 2001, "The specific role of non-profit organizations in the integration of disadvantaged people: Insights from economic analysis", in Roger Spear et al. (Editors) *Tackling Social Exclusion in Europe: The Contribution of the Social Economy* (Aldershot UK: Ashgate).
- Brugiavini, Agar: 2001, "Early retirement in Europe", *European Review* 9(4), pp. 501-515.
- Busse, Reinhard, Gregory Wurzburg & Mario Zappacosta: 2003, "Shaping the societal bill: Past and future trends in education, pensions and healthcare expenditures", *Futures* 35(1), pp. 7-24.
- Byatt, A.S.: 2002, "What is a European", *The New York Times Magazine* (October 13), pp. 46-51.
- Calleo, David P.: 2003, *Rethinking Europe's Future* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Carlson, Benny. 2002, *Europe's Welfare Burden: The Case For Reform* (London: Civitas Institute for the Study of Civil Society).
- Carlson, Elwood: 2003, "New demographic faces of Europe: The changing population dynamics in countries of Central and Eastern Europe", *Population Studies* 57(1), pp. 112-113.
- Curzon-Price, Victoria, Alice Landau & Richard Whitman: 1999, *The Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies* (New York: Routledge).
- De Haan, Arjan: 1998, "'Social exclusion': An alternative concept for the study of deprivation?" *IDS Bulletin* 29(1), pp. 10-19.
- Delsen, Lei: 2001, "EMU and the social environment," *European J of Social Quality* 3(1-2), pp. 70-89.
- Dodds, Klaus: 2000, "Political geography II: Some thoughts on banality, new wars and the geopolitical tradition", *Progress in Human Geography* 24(1), pp. 119-129.
- Editors: 1997, "Remodeling Scandinavia", *The Economist* (August 23), pp. 37-39.
- Editors: 2000a, "Attaturk's long shadow: A survey of Turkey", *The Economist* (special supplement), June 10, pp. 1-16.
- Editors: 2000b, "A country of many faces: A survey of Spain", *The Economist* (special supplement), November 25, pp. 1-18.
- Editors: 2000c, Half-way there: A survey of Portugal, *The Economist* (special supplement), December 2, pp. 1-16.,
- Editors: 2000d, "Lean, mean and European: A survey of European business", *The Economist* (special supplement), April 29, pp. 1-20.

- Editors: 2001a, "What a lovely place: A survey of Italy", *The Economist* (special supplement), July 7, pp. 1-18.
- Editors: 2001b, "Work in progress: A survey of European business and the euro", *The Economist* (special supplement), December 1, pp. 1-16.
- Editors: 2001c, "Europe's magnetic attraction: A survey of European enlargement", *The Economist* (special supplement), May 19, pp. 1-16.
- Editors: 2002a, Model makers: A survey of the Netherlands, *The Economist* (special supplement), May 4, pp. 1-18.
- Editors: 2002b, Prometheus unbound: A survey of Greece, *The Economist* (special supplement), October 12, pp. 1-20.
- Editors: 2002c, A divided self: A survey of France, *The Economist* (special supplement), November 16, pp. 1-20.
- Editors: 2002d, "After the chaos: A survey of finance in Central Europe", *The Economist* (special supplement), September 14, pp. 1-16.
- Editors: 2002e, "An uncertain giant: A survey of Germany", *The Economist* (special supplement), December 7, pp. 1-20.
- Editors: 2002f, "Turkey and the EU", *The Economist* (February 23), pp. 53-54.
- Editors: 2002g, "Turkey and the EU", *The Economist* (December 21), p. 68.
- Editors: 2002h, "Greece's war on home-grown terror", *The Economist* (July 13), pp. 44-45.
- Editors: 2002i, "Terrorism in Spain", *The Economist* (August 17), p. 44.
- Editors: 2002j, "The EU summit on liberalization", *The Economist* (March 23), p. 49.
- Editors: 2002k, "Anti-immigrant politicians", *The Economist* (March 16), p. 56.
- Editors: 2002l, "Europe's economies: Room for improvement", *The Economist* (March 16), pp. 69-71.
- Editors: 2002m, "Privatisation in Europe: Coming home to roost", *The Economist* (June 29), pp. 63-65.
- Editors: 2002n, "Muslims in Western Europe: Dim drums throbbing in the hills half heard", *The Economist* (August 10), pp. 21-23.
- Editors: 2002o, "Europe's work in progress: Why does Europe's productivity growth lag so far behind America's?", *The Economist* (November 16), p. 72.
- Editors: 2002p, "Europe's far right: Toxic but containable", *The Economist* (April 27), pp. 47-48.
- Editors: 2002q, "America and Europe: Who needs whom?", *The Economist* (March 9), pp. 30-32.
- Editors: 2003a, "Dancing to a new tune: A survey of the Nordic region", *The Economist* (special supplement), June 14, pp. 1-16.
- Editors: 2003b, "Economic and financial indicators", *The Economist* (August 30), pp. 72-74.
- Editors: 2003c, "Slashing Portugal's public sector", *The Economist* (July 5), p. 45.
- Editors: 2003d, "France and terrorism", *The Economist* (January 4), p. 38.
- Editors: 2003e, "Germany's vital labour reforms", *The Economist* (March 8), p. 50.
- Editors: 2003f, "The European Union's constitution," *The Economist* (February 15), p. 47.
- Editors: 2003g, "Catching Europe's Islamist terrorists", *The Economist* (February 1), p. 44.
- Editors: 2003h, "Revitalizing old Europe: Adverse demographics demand longer working lives and Swedish-style pension reforms", *The Economist* (March 15), p. 74.
- Editors: 2003i, "The European Union's constitution: Tidying up or tyranny?" *The Economist* (May 31), pp. 51-52.
- Editors: 2003j, "France on strike", *The Economist* (May 31), p. 54.
- Editors: 2003k, "Might German students have to pay?", *The Economist* (May 10), p. 44.
- Editors: 2003l, "Europe's constitution", *The Economist* (June 21), pp. 51-54.
- Editors: 2003m, "Tax cuts for Germans", *The Economist* (June 21), p. 41.
- Editors: 2003n, "Germany's timid health care reforms", *The Economist* (June 7), p. 43-44.
- Editors: 2003o, "A government assailed: Anti-reform demonstrations are becoming more violent" (France), *The Economist* (June 14), pp. 47.
- Editors: 2003p, "Loosening those bonds: Europe's stability and growth pact", *The Economist* (July 19), pp. 38-39.
- Editors: 2003q, "United in theory, divided in practice: European diplomacy over Iraq", *The Economist* (February 22), p. 45.
- Ehrke: Michael: 2000, "Revisionism revisited: The 'third way' and European social democracy", *Concepts & Transformation* 5(10):7-27.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta: 1999, *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies* (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press).
- Estes, Richard J.: 2004, *At the Crossroads: Dilemmas in International Development*

- (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers)--in preparation.
- Estes, Richard J.: 1998a, "Social development trends in the successor states to the former Soviet Union: The Search for a new paradigm", in Kempe R. Hope, Jr., *Challenges of Transformation and Transition From Centrally Planned to Market Economies*, UNCRD Research Report Series No. 26. (Nagoya: United Nations Centre for Regional Development), pp. 13-30.
- Estes, Richard J.: 1998b, "Trends in world social development, 1970-95: Development prospects for a new century," *Journal of Developing Societies* 14(1), pp. 11-39.
- Estes, Richard J.: 1997, "Trends in European social development, 1970-1994", *Social Indicators Research* 42(1), pp. 1-19.
- Estes, Richard J.: 1996a, "Social Development trends in Latin America, 1970-1994: In the Shadows of the 21st Century", *Social Development Issues* 18(1), pp. 25-52.
- Estes, Richard J.: 1996b, "Social Development trends in Asia, 1970-1994: The Challenges of a New Century", *Social Indicators Research* 37(2), pp. 119-148.
- Estes, Richard J. & Edward Van Roy: 1992, *Towards a Social Development Strategy for the ESCAP Region* (Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ST/ESCAP/1170).
- Estes, Richard J.: 1990, "Social development under different political and economic systems," *Social Development Issues* 13(1), pp. 5-19.
- Estes, Richard J.: 1988, *Trends in World Social Development: The Social Progress of Nations, 1970-1987* (New York: Praeger).
- Estes, Richard J.: 1986, "Europe tops survey of most livable countries," *Europe* (November), pp. 36-37
- Estes, Richard J.: 1984, *The Social Progress of Nations* (New York: Praeger Publishers).
- Evers, Adelbert & Helmut Wintersberger (Editors): 1988, *Shifts in the Welfare Mix: Their Impact on Work, Social Services and Welfare Policies* (Vienna: European Centre for Social Welfare Training and Research).
- Fajth, Gaspar: 1999, "Social security in a rapidly changing environment: The case of the post-communist transformation", *Social Policy & Administration* 33(4), pp. 416-436.
- Farrell, Mary, Stefano Fella & Michael Newman (Editors): 2002, *European Integration in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Unity in Diversity?* (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications).
- Feld, Serge. 2000, "Active population growth and immigration hypotheses in Western Europe", *European J of Population* 16(1), pp. 3-40.
- Ferge, Zsuzsa: 2001, "European integration and the reform of social security in the accession countries", *European J of Social Quality* 3(1), pp. 9-25.
- Ferge, Zsuzsa & Jon E. Kolberg (Editors): 1992, *Social Policy in a Changing Europe* (Boulder CO: Westview Press).
- Gijsberts, Merove: 2002, "The legitimation of income inequality in state-socialist and market societies", *Acta Sociologica* 45(4), pp. 269-285.
- Gillingham, John: 2003, *The European Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Hewitt, Paul S.: 2002, "Depopulation and ageing in Europe and Japan: The hazardous transition to a labor shortage economy", *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 1:111-120.
- Howard Marc M: 2003, *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press).
- Hyde, Mark & John Dixon: 2002, "Globalization, poverty, ideology and the privatization of social protection in Western Europe: Welfare retrenchment or social citizenship?", *New Global Development* 18(1-2), pp. 3-19.
- Jasson, Chiara: 2001, "The challenge of European identity", *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 20(2), pp. 151-158.
- Karlson, Nils: 2002, *The State of State: Invisible Hands in Politics and Society* (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers).
- Keely, Charles B.: 2001, "Replacement migration: The wave of the future?", *International Migration* 39(6), pp. 103-110.
- Kopeckay, Petr & Cas Mudde: 2003, *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe* (London & New York: Routledge).
- Kurczewska, Joanna: 1999, "Contemporary Europe-ethnicization of poverty", *Polish Sociological Review* 1(125), pp. 73-83.
- Larrabee, Stephen F.: 2002, "US Middle East policy after 9/11: Implications for transatlantic relations", *International Spectator* 37(3), pp. 43-56.
- Maccarini, Andrea M.: 1999, "Inclusion and exclusion in the "new social space" of Europe: Sociological reflection in Eng-

- lish", *Sociologia e Politiche Sociali* 2(3), pp. 237-246.
- MacMaster, Neil: 2001, *Racism in Europe, 1870-2000* (Hampshire UK: Palgrave Publishing).
- Marsh, Christopher et al. (Editors): 2002, *Civil Society and the Search For Justice in Russia* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books).
- Mason, T. David and Abdul M. Turay (Editors): 1994, *Japan, NAFTA, and Europe: Trilateral Cooperation or Confrontation?* (New York: St. Martin's Press).
- McCarthy, Kathleen D.: 2003, *American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- McLaren, Lauren M.: 2003, "Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe: Contact, threat perception, and preferences for the exclusion of migrants", *Social Forces* 81(3), pp. 909-936.
- Meier-Dallach, Hans-Peter & Jakob Juchler: 2002, *Postsocialist Transformations and Civil Society in a Globalizing World* (Huntingdon NY: Nova Science Publishers).
- Morin, Marie-Laure & Christine Vicens: 2001, "Redundancy, business flexibility and workers' security: Findings of a comparative European survey", *International Labour Review* 140(1), pp. 45-67.
- Muller, K.: 1999, *The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Central-Eastern Europe* (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar).
- Muller, K, A. Ryll & R.-J. Wagener (Editors): 1999, *Transformation of Society Security: Pensions Central-Eastern Europe* (Heidelberg: Physica).
- Noll, Heinz-Herbert: 2002, "Towards a European system of social indicators: Theoretical framework and system architecture", in Michael Haggerty, Joachim Vogel and Valerie. Moeller (Editors), *Assessing Quality of Life Living Conditions to Guide National Policy. Social Indicators Research, Volume 11:47-87*.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2002. *OECD in Figures, 2002, Supplement 1* (Paris: OECD).
- Pierson, Paul (Editor): 2001, *The New Politics of the Welfare State* (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press).
- Pond, Elizabeth: 2002, *The Rebirth of Europe* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press).
- Richmond, Anthony H.: 2002, "Globalization: Implications for immigrants and refugees", *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 25(5), pp. 707-727.
- Rose, Richard & Neil Munro: 2003, *Elections and Parties in New European Democracies* (Washington: CQ Press).
- Rosenberg, Jerry M.: 1992, *The New American Community: A Response to the European and Asian Economic Challenge* (Westport: Praeger Publishers).
- Rumford, Chris: 2000, *European Cohesion? Contradictions in European Integration* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Rys, Vladimir: 2000, "The entry of transition countries of central Europe into the European Union: Some social protection issues", *Czech Sociological Review* 8(2), pp. 131-138.
- Saint-Martin, Denis: 2000, "The politics of social cohesion and concealing socioeconomic differences", *Cooperatives et Développement* 31(1), pp. 24-38.
- Sander, Gordon F.: 1996, *Sweden after the fall*, *Wilson Quarterly* 20(2), pp. 46-71.
- Scheepers, Peer, Manfred Te Grotenhuis & John Gelissen: 2002, "Welfare states and dimensions of social capital: Cross-national comparisons of social contacts in European countries", *European Societies* 4(2), pp. 185-207.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank & Ulrich Sedelmeier: 2002, "Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses and the State of Research", *J of European Public Policy* 9(4), pp. 500-528.
- Schulz, Brigitte H.: 2000, "Globalisation, unification and the German welfare state", *International Social Science J* 52(1), pp. 39-50.
- Sokolowski, S. Wojciech: 2001, *Civil Society and the Professions in Eastern Europe* (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
- Souza, Lucio Vinhas de & Bas van Aarle (Editors): 2003, *The Euroarea and the New EU Member States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu: 2002, "Locating Europe", *European Societies* 4(3), pp. 265-284.
- Stalker, Peter: 2002, "Migration trends and migration policy in Europe", *International Migration* 40(5), pp. 151-179.
- Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute: 2002, *SIPRI Yearbook* (Stockholm: SIPRI).
- Stranovnik, T., N. Stropnik & C. Prinz (Editors): 2000, *Economic Well-Being of the Eld-*

- erly: A Comparison Across Five European Countries (Aldershot UK: Ashgate).
- Tallberg, Jonas: 2003, *European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States Comply* (New York: Routledge).
- Transparency International: 2001, *Global Corruption Report, 2001* (Berlin: Transparency International).
- United Nations Development Programme: 2002, *Human Development Report, 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE): 2001, *Economic Survey of Europe, Spring 2001*. (Geneva: UN/ECE), Sales No.: E.01.II.E.14.
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: 2002, *Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, 2002*. (Washington: Office of Policy Analysis, Social Security Administration).
- Van Til, Jon: 2001, *Growing Civil Society: From Nonprofit Sector to Third Space* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press).
- Van Winden, Willem: 2001, "The end of social exclusion? On information technology policy as a key to social inclusion in large European cities", *Regional Studies* 35(9), pp. 861-877.
- Vaughan-Whitehead, Daniel: 2003, *EU Enlargement vs. Social Europe: The Uncertain Future of the European Social Model* (Northampton UK: Edward Elgar Publishing).
- Verdun, Amy: 2002, *European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration: Perceptions of Economic and Monetary Union in Britain, France and Germany* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Visser, Jelle: 2000, "From Keynesianism to the 'third way': Labour relations and social policy in postwar Western Europe", *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 21(4), pp. 421-456.
- Vogel, Joachim: 2002a, "Ageing and living conditions of the elderly: Sweden 1980-1998", *Social Indicators Research* 59(1), pp. 1-34.
- Vogel, Joachim: 2002b, "Strategies and traditions in Swedish social reporting: A 30-year experience", *Social Indicators Research* 58(1-2), pp. 89-113.
- Vogel, Joachim: 2002c, "European welfare regimes and the transition to adulthood: A comparative and longitudinal perspective", *Social Indicators Research* 59(3), pp. 275-299.
- Warnes, Anthony M.: 2002, "The challenge of intra-union and in-migration to 'social Europe'", *J of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 28(1), pp. 135-152.
- Wessels, Wolfgang, Andreas Maurer & Jurgen Mittag (Editors): 2003, *Fifteen Into One? The European Union and Its Member States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- World Bank: 2002, *World Development Indicators, 2002* (Washington: The World Bank).
- World Bank: 2003, *World Development Report, 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press).

